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Effective and timely acquisition planning is vital to the successful procurement of a
major weapon system. However, the underlying process may not be well understood or
defined, is labor intensive and heavily bureaucratic. Efforts to improve the planning
function for a major weapon system traditionally focus on the people and organizational
aspects without showing any real reductions in time or increases in productivity. New
approaches, such as business process reengineering, now show considerable promise in
dramatically reducing cycle times, especially when combined with information technology
as an enabler. This paper explores the use of information technology in the development
of an acquisition plan at a major systems command and suggests that process innovations
of 50% or more may be possible. To accomplish this improvement, the process of
developing an acquisition plan is redesigned using database and workflow systems as
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Effective planning is vital to the success of any business undertaking. This is
especially true in the acquisition of major weapon systems within the Department of
Defense. Even though recent reductions in statutory and regulatory requirements make
the Federal acquisition process less complex, it is still "apparent that sound acquisition
planning is the key to success." [Ref 1 :p. 9]
A search ofthe literature indicates that prior to the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) of 1984, acquisition planning in some Government agencies may have been
performed in a sporadic and fragmented manner. Formal procedures or processes, if
developed, may not have been followed, and if so were usually developed on a program-
by-program basis. Planning that did occur was usually informal, and depended
considerably on the interaction and experience of the personnel involved. This lack of a
formal planning process may have "led to situations where the contracting officer had
inadequate time to conduct procurement effectively." [Ref. l:p. 9-10]
The 1984 Competition in Contracting Act corrected the lack of formal planning, at
least indirectly, by requiring that agencies "do a better job of planning and preparing for
competitive procurements." [Ref. 2:p. 81] Although procurement planning had been done
in some form or another for at least 25 years, CICA now required its use. Congress
expressed its belief that procuring agencies were not doing the kind of planning necessary
to effectively manage the procurement process. [Ref. 2:p. 81] To correct this, Congress
directed in Title 41, U.S.C. Section 253a (a) (1) (B) and Title 10, U.S.C. Section 2305 (a)
(1) (A) (ii) that agencies would now "use advance procurement planning."
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) at Part 7 defines acquisition planning as
"the process [emphasis added] by which the efforts of all the personnel responsible for an
acquisition are coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the
agency need in a timely manner, and at a reasonable cost." The FAR requires the
development of a comprehensive acquisition plan as soon as the agency need is
determined.
As a result of OCA, and its shift toward competitive procurements, acquisition
planning now became more necessary and formalized. [Ref 2:p. 81] Acquisition plans are
required by FAR 7.105 to have milestones that address all of the technical, business,
management, and other significant considerations that will control the acquisition.
Although the FAR spells out all of the elements of an acquisition plan, nowhere does the
FAR spell out a specific process to use in developing an acquisition plan. At best,
acquisition planning can best be thought of as an iterative process that becomes
increasingly more definitive as the weapon system progresses from program initiation
through post-production support. [Ref. 3:p. 3.3-3.4]
The underlying process, or processes, that drive the development of an
acquisition plan are not well understood or defined. In a study conducted by the Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) of several Government agencies, it found that no
documented acquisition planning process existed prior to LMTs efforts to develop one.
Many organizations depended on their staffs to handle the next acquisition plan "just like
they did the last one." [Ref. 4:p. 378] Most often the only record or insight that existed of
the acquisition planning process was in "the memory of the participants, particularly for
steps at the interface between components." The elements of an acquisition plan may be
relatively well defined, but the process of generating, or formalizing, the acquisition plan
may not be as well understood. [Ref. 4:p 382]
In order to begin understanding acquisition planning as a process, the term process
must first be understood. A process is a structured and measurable set of activities
designed to produce a specific output. Processes are centered around how things are
done, as opposed to what is to be done, such as an acquisition plan. Typically, processes
have a beginning, an end, and a clearly identifiable input and output. Processes cut
through the typical hierarchical and vertical structures associated with organizations.
"Whereas an organization's hierarchical structure is typically a slice-in-time view of
responsibility and reporting relationships, its process structure is a dynamic view of how
the organization delivers value." [Ref. 30:p. 6]
Many business processes "are characterized by a mode of operation in which work
flows in a serial fashion from one process to another." [Ref. 4:p. 378-379] When these
administrative processes break down, "patches" are applied to fix the problem. Over time,
a series of patches will most likely produce a poorly operating process. Fragmentation
and splintering will result and further reduce the efficiency of this process. Perhaps the
only way to effectively correct this problem is by redesigning, or reengineering, the
existing business process. [Ref. 4:p. 379]
Michael Hammer and James Champy in their 1993 book, Reengineering the
Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution, defined Business Process
Reengineering (BPR) as:
fTJhe fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary
measures ofperformance such as cost, quality, service, and speed.
Within this definition, Hammer gave four key words that provide the essence of
reengineering. The first word, fundamental, provides the most basic notion of
reengineering; Why do we do what we do? It takes nothing for granted, ignores what is,
and concentrates on what should be. The second key word, radical, means getting to the
root of the problem. In context, it means disregarding all existing procedures and
inventing completely new ways of doing things. The third word, dramatic, means a
quantum leap in performance, not a marginal or incremental improvement such as with
Total Quality Management (TQM). A 50% or greater improvement, not a five or ten
percent improvement. And the last, and most important word, processes, is used within
reengineering to mean a collection of business activities or tasks that takes inputs and
provides an output of value to a customer. Reengineering is different in that it does not
focus on discrete tasks, jobs, people or structures, but on a business process as a whole.
[Ref. 5:p. 32-36]
In the most basic sense, reengineering is about starting over with a blank sheet of
paper. It is about inventing new approaches to business processes that may bear no
resemblance to existing processes. It is not about restructuring or downsizing merely for
the sake of cutting budgets. Nor is BPR about new ways to reorganize or eliminate
bureaucracies. It differs from Total Quality Management (TQM) in that TQM is about
continuous, iterative improvements approach to business processes. BPR innovates.
Finally, BPR is not the same as automation. Automation, in many cases may only provide
a more efficient way of performing a broken process. [Ref. 5:p. 47-49]
Within BPR, automation is considered an enabler that fosters dramatic
improvements in business process. However, automation of business processes has not
produced the dramatic improvements in productivity as previously envisioned or hoped.
Private corporations have spent billions of dollars over the last forty years to automate
tasks with no fundamental improvement in performance. There has been a tremendous
outlay of organizational capital on automation, usually with questionable or disappointing
returns. [Ref. 5:p. 25]
Much of this disappointment with technology in BPR is attributable to the
application of automation over the existing business process found within an organization.
Information technology (IT) sped up existing business processes, but did little, if anything,
to change imbedded process deficiencies that the successful application of BPR would
demand. "Automating existing process with information technology is analogous to
paving cow paths. Automation simply provides more efficient ways of doing the wrong
kinds of things." [Ref. 5:p. 48]
Information technology has assisted the process of developing acquisition plans
mainly through word processing, spreadsheet, and limited database applications. For
instance, development of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) sponsored Master
Acquisition Planning Program (MAPP) consolidates the over 100 plans potentially
referenced in the typical acquisition plan. Its goal is "to improve the planning process
through enhanced communication, more efficient use of resources, and reduced cycle
time." However, MAPP may have little or no effect on the underlying process that
produces the acquisition plan. [Ref. 6: p. i-iii]
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is:
How can the acquisition planning process for a major weapons system be
reengineered to effect order-of-magnitude improvements in performance? Subsidiary
questions would include:
I. What are the principal elements that make up the acquisition planning process?
II. What reengineering or process improvements have been made to the acquisition
system and what effect have these had on acquisition planning?
III. What has been the role of IT in these process improvement efforts and what effects
has the introduction of IT had on the process?
A. What effect did the initial introduction of IT have on the acquisition
process in terms of productivity?
B. How has the introduction of IT into the acquisition process affected both
personnel and organizational structures?
C. What is the current state of IT in the acquisition planning process and what
changes will take place in the immediate future?
IV. What pathologies and faults remain in the current acquisition planning process and
what technologies or redesigns can be implemented to overcome them?
V. What steps are required to successfully implement these technologies or redesigns?
VI. How would the employment of the BPR model change future implementations of
IT in the acquisition planning process?
B. RESEARCH METHOD
Information used in the preparation of this thesis was obtained through literature
and field research. Online library catalogs and periodical databases were searched.
Additionally, a comprehensive search of the Internet was conducted using various search
engines. Relevant books, articles and other documents cited as a result of these literature
searches are in the List of References. Some of the material was brought to the
researcher's attention during phone conversations and interviews.
A major system command, the Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR) was
approached to provide a source of current and relevant information on the acquisition
planning process. Command instructions and other published guidance was used to assess
the NAVAIR acquisition planning process and improvements that could be attained using
information technology. However, it was not treated as a case study in order to critique
NAVAIR' s efficiency in developing particular acquisition plans, its programs or their
personnel. In reality it was chosen for two reasons.
First, NAVAIR' s use of a core competency approach to the management of its
planning process was conducive to effectively allowing the studying of the process. Core
competency requires management to think much more carefully about the firms business
activities. [Ref. 42:p. 66] This focus on core competencies eliminates many of the
extraneous problems associated with the poor management of people and resources.
Second, NAVAIR is very proactive in the study and automation of acquisition processes,
providing a fertile area for research. Combined, this allowed the researcher to effectively
study the underlying acquisition planning process and use it as a practical input to the BPR
analysis.
Additional information was gathered from other organizations that develop or
acquire acquisition planning software systems. These included systems used, or planned
for use in the near term, by the Departments of the Navy, Air Force and Department of
Defense (DoD).
C. SCOPE OF THESIS RESEARCH
The main thrust of this thesis is on the application of BPR to the process of
developing an acquisition plan within a major system command. It also includes, for
background and clarification, a limited analysis of the organizational, legislative and
personnel factors that contribute to, or affect, an acquisition plan.
The contribution of IT to the process of developing an acquisition plan is examined
as an integral part of the overall acquisition process, not as a stand alone factor. This
thesis attempts to apply the BPR model with the goal of presenting a new process for
developing acquisition plans that takes advantage of, and leverages, the power of modern
IT. Based on the analysis using BPR, a new process for developing acquisition plans will
be suggested for future study.
This thesis does not look at IT from a micro level view. No new code or software
development is anticipated, although some areas ripe for development may be suggested.
Examples would include the use of collaborative integrated design (CTD) software,
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS), Artificial Intelligence (AI), software agents and expert





The Defense acquisition system is extremely complex. Literally hundreds of
thousands of employees work within an administrative system designed to execute millions
of contract actions each year. Major weapon systems, involving billions of dollars, push
the envelope of technology by attempting to achieve performance levels not previously
imagined. The combination of all these factors causes high levels of contract uncertainty
and considerable technical risk in the developmental process for a major weapon system.
[Ref. 7:p. 109]
The risk represented in these inherently complex acquisitions manifests itself in all
phases of the program or process. It is measured by the inability to achieve overall
program goals and objectives within defined cost, schedule, and technical/performance
constraints. The two components of this measure are the probability of failing to achieve
a particular goal or outcome and the consequences of failing to achieve the goal or desired
outcome. Risk management is the term applied to the act or practice of controlling risk
within a program. It includes identifying and tracking risk drivers, developing risk
mitigation plans and continuously assessing risk to determine how it changes over the
course of the program.
Given that risk is present throughout all phases of a program, failure to adequately
manage and anticipate it can have an extremely adverse affect on a program's success. The
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primary method to manage and control risk is an early and comprehensive planning effort
followed by the aggressive execution of that plan. [Ref 8.] Within DoD this planning
effort is partly managed by two formal documents, the acquisition strategy and the
acquisition plan.
B. ACQUISITION STRATEGY AND PLANNING
The acquisition strategy provides a top level description that is used by senior
decision makers to assess whether a program makes good business sense, effectively
implements laws and policies, and reflects top management's priorities. Once approved by
the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the acquisition strategy provides the basis for
more detailed planning. [Ref. 9.]
The Program Manager (PM) is responsible for developing the acquisition strategy.
In the most basic sense, the acquisition strategy is "the framework for planning,
organizing, staffing, coordinating, and leading a program. It provides a master schedule
for research, development, test, production, fielding, and other activities essential for
program success and for formulating functional strategies and plans." [Ref. 10: p. 1-1]
This document covers the program from initiation through post-production support and
includes all critical events necessary for the success of the program. By its very nature,
the acquisition strategy is a plan that evolves through an iterative process, becoming
increasingly more defined as the program matures through its various phases. The
acquisition strategy provides a substantial portion of the functional acquisition plan. [Ref.
3:p. 3.3-3.4]
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The acquisition plan is also the responsibility ofthe PM, but the actual preparation
is performed by the Contracting Officer (CO). Acquisition plans differ from strategies in
that they are functional, execution level oriented documents. [Ref. 10:p. 4-3] It
coordinates and integrates planning of all functions needed to execute the acquisition
program. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires acquisition planning for all
procurement, and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
requires PMs to prepare written acquisition plans for most acquisitions exceeding $5
million. [Ref. 9.]
C. ACQUISITION PLANNING REQUIREMENTS OF FAR PART 7
The FAR, Part 7, requires federal agencies to perform acquisition planning for all
acquisitions. This planning should include and integrate the efforts of all personnel
responsible for significant aspects of the acquisition with the purpose of ensuring that the
Government fulfills its needs in the "most effective, economical, and timely manner."
Although it does not say a written plan should be prepared in every case, it does say that
agency heads should establish criteria at which increasingly complex acquisitions may
require written acquisition plans.
Acquisition planning as envisioned by the FAR encourages acquisition planning as
soon as the agency's need is identified. One of the key points of the FAR is the
requirement that the acquisition planner form a team consisting of "all those who will be
responsible for significant aspects of the acquisition, such as contracting, fiscal, legal, and
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technical personnel." Additionally, this involvement must occur "early" in the planning
process and should be done with requirements and logistics personnel.
Along with considering the technical and logistical concerns, the written plan must
address all of the "technical, business, management, and other significant considerations
that will control the acquisition." Specific contents of a plan may vary depending on the
"nature, circumstances, and stage of the acquisition." However, in actually writing and
preparing the plan, the planner is required to follow and address mandatory sections of
the FAR at Part 7 (See Appendix A).
The written acquisition plan as prescribed by the FAR can be an inherently
complex document. It is nominally broken down into two sections. The first section deals
with the background and objectives of the acquisition and "considers what the
Government is buying, how it will evaluate price and other cost factors, where it is to be
performed, and the risk involved." [Ref l:p. 22] The second section, the plan of action,
describes the steps the agency will take to procure the weapon system.
The complexity issue arises from all of the divergent and overlapping factors laid
out in the acquisition planning requirements of FAR Part 7. For instance, consideration
must be given to logistics support issues throughout the life of the acquisition plan. If
changes occur to Integrated Logistics Support plans (as invariably will occur), this input
must be reflected in the acquisition plan if the desired results are to occur. By some
estimates, over 100 plans are developed during the acquisition planning process for a
major weapons system. [Ref. 11]
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D. NAVY AQUISITION PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
The Navy Acquisition Planning Guide (APG) states that the Acquisition Plan (AP)
documents the results of-advanee acquisition planning. It includes, usually by reference,
other plans developed during the acquisition planning process such as the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan (ILSP), the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), or the Navy
Training Plan (NTP). When approved, it represents a formal agreement between the
acquisition Program Manager (PM), Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO), Chief of the
Contracting Office, and the Program Executive Officer (PEO) as to how the PM will
execute the program. Within the Department ofthe Navy, a written AP is required for the
following acquisitions: [Ref 12]
• All ship construction programs and Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP).
• Acquisitions for development programs estimated at $5,000,000 or more.
• Acquisitions for production or services estimated at $30,000,000 or more for
all years and $15,000,000 or more for any fiscal -year.
• Any other acquisition as designated by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(ASN) or higher authority.
APs are not required for procurements such as military construction, commercial items,
spare parts, overhauls, and final buy out or one-time buys.
1. Naval Aviation Systems Command Requirements
At the Naval Air Systems Command, the acquisition plan is the principal document
used by the PM for program review and oversight. As a matter of practice, the AP is
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initially prepared at the same time that available funds and resources are identified to solve
a particular need. Because of this, the AP is linked directly to the Future Year Defense
Program (FYDP) and becomes the primary means to introduce the scope and magnitude
of a particular program into the budget process. [Ref. 13:p. 2-1]
E. SUMMARY
Acquiring a major weapon system is an inherently complex undertaking because of
its large dollar value and technological requirements. Because of this, considerable risk is
present in all phases of the acquisition. The development of an acquisition strategy and
plan is intended to lower risk by defining key elements: performance, risk, and cost.
Acquisition plans act as vehicles to combine other functional plans into a coherent whole
that the PM uses to manage the overall acquisition.
A thorough search of the literature revealed that acquisition planning is
predominately concerned with the functional and administrative aspects such as who is
responsible for their development, policies to follow in development, and the form plans
should take when completed. Thus, what is required to be in a formal acquisition plan or
strategy is generally well defined. How we plan for the acquisition of a major weapon
system is less certain and is frequently left to the discretion ofthose involved. The focus is
on the product and not on the process. Although acquisition planning is defined as a
process in the FAR, little is actually written that describes the underlying process.
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m. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
Improvements in the acquisition system have come about as a result of both
internal and external pressures. Internally, changes that occurred in the acquisition of
major weapon systems were driven by the growing complexity of these systems since
World War II. Technological changes combined with increasing cost made previous
organization methods unsuitable for managing the intricate weapon systems now
demanded by the war fighter. This resulted in the evolution of the project management
approach when acquiring major weapons systems.
Externally, other forces acted to improve the acquisition system. Over the years
Congress has periodically taken the initiative to improve or influence the acquisition of
defense systems. Major legislative actions include the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) and, more recently, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA).
Of relevance here is to what extent have changes to the acquisition system, both
internal and external, influenced the process of planning for these acquisitions.
Understanding of the intent of these improvements to the acquisition system may shed
some light on where the focus has traditionally been. In some cases, changes evolved or
were initiated that applied directly to the process. And, in other cases, the change may




As stated by Michael Hammer, "There are some differences between the private
and public sectors, but it's my experience that differences are much less important than
similarities." [Ref. 14] Most private industrial corporations are organized, for internal
operations, along functional lines as are their Government counterparts. [Ref. 2: p. 120-
121] The underlying cause for any differences between the two is that Government
organizations have somewhat different goals and objectives. [Ref. 15:p. 1-1] These would
include the fulfillment of social and economic goals and objectives such as those for
Socially Disadvantaged and Minority Firms, Federal Prison Industries, Buy American Act,
and Small Business Act. [Ref. 2:p. 1 and Ref. 16:pg. 8-9]
Within the DoD slightly different procurement organization structures have
developed in response to the rigorous demands of developing a major weapon system. To
comprehend the difficulty of planning for an acquisition requires an understanding of the
complex business and administrative systems prevalent in procurement organizations.
These systems employ planning and control functions that are sometimes at odds with the
traditional hierarchical approach found in the management of many organizations. [Ref.
2:p. 120-121]
1. Development of the Project Management Organization
Since World War II the approach to acquisition management and organization has
changed considerably. One reason has been the constantly growing change in the
technical complexity and the sheer size of weapon systems acquisitions. As weapon
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systems became more complex and technologically challenging, the ability of traditional
bureaucratic organizations to coordinate and control the actions of virtually hundreds of
other organizations and thousands of people proved to be unrealistic. [Ref. 2: p. 120]
The principles of division of labor and hierarchical control of organizations
appeared to be ineffective when applied to the acquisition and management of highly
visible, complex, and costly weapon systems. When it became apparent that these
management techniques did not possess the flexibility and robustness necessary for
success, new management approaches were developed. [Ref. 2:p. 120-121]
The chief change that evolved in the acquisition of weapon systems was the
development of the Project or Program Management approach. Program management
tends to violate traditional management structures such as lines of authority, span of
control, unity of command, and task specialization. Under project management, a parent
organization establishes the project and assigns the personnel. Upon completion of the
project, the temporary organization disbands and the personnel are reabsorbed back into
the parent organization. Program management appears to be one of the current
approaches used in managing complex undertakings. [Ref. 2:p. 120-121]
There are two prevalent organizational structures used in project management: the
project organization and matrix organizations. Project organizations are more routinely
used in laboratories and advanced development program offices. In this organization,
project team members report directly to the project manager rather than to a functional or
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line manager. Team members from a variety of disciplines are integrated into a single unit
that supports one project at a time. [Ref. 17:p 22.2-22.3]
Major weapon systems are more frequently managed in a matrix organization
referred to as program office or system program office (SPO). In this organization
structure, the program office is managed by a program director or a program manager
(PM) who normally reports to a program executive officer (PEO). Under the PM are a
number of functional areas such as contracts, logistics, and systems engineering controlled
by division heads. The program office also includes a projects division comprised of
project managers. Project managers may be responsible for specific subsystems,
integration projects, or system modification efforts. They may also be responsible for
multiple projects depending on the size ofthe undertaking. [Ref. 17:p. 22.2-22.3]
2. Development of the Integrated Product Team
Until recently, matrix organizations have been the prevalent means ofmanaging the
acquisition of a major weapon systems program. However, Integrated Product Teams
(IPT) are rapidly surfacing as the primary method for controlling large undertakings. In
the latest version of the DoD 5000.2-R the Secretary of Defense "directed that the
Department of Defense perform as many acquisition functions as possible, including
oversight and review, using EPTs " Additionally, the Secretary decreed that "IPTs
would be composed of representatives from all appropriate functional disciplines working
together to build successful programs and enabling decision-makers to make the right
decision at the right time." [Ref. 3: p. 1-7]
20
IPTs may overcome some of the more traditional problems still present in matrix
organizations. Even though independent technical organizations such as engineering,
testing, and procurement provide matrix support to the PM, layered functional
management still exists. Time consuming meetings, briefings, and staffing requirements
may slow the acquisition process and decision making. Additionally, vestiges of the
functional organization remain, vying for limited program management office resources.
This tends to result in the management "stovepipes" and inefficient communications, those
things that the matrix organization originally sought to remove. [Ref 18:p. 165]
One result of implementing IPTs in the acquisition process is a flatter organization
with a streamlined decision making process. A flatter organization moves decision making
down to the lowest possible level. These benefits manifest themselves as one would
expect—reduced development time, lower personnel cost, and improved integration of the
finished product. [Ref. 18:p. 164]
One inevitable problem cited with these new organizational structures is the
conflict that arises between project managers and the vestiges of traditional organizations,
the functional division managers. This conflict arises out of the power struggle as each of
these managers vies for the organization's resources. Dilemmas arise between team
members regarding priorities, commitments and allegiances. If not dealt with in a timely
manner, severe problems can affect the acquisition. [Ref. 17: p. 22.6]
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C. HUMAN RESOURCE IMPROVEMENTS
Since enactment of CICA in 1984, there has been an acceleration in procurement
initiatives undertaken by Congress. [Ref. 2:p. 79] This rapidly changing environment will
most likely require personnel who are capable of understanding and implementing those
changes. If the acquisition workforce can not comprehend important process changes or
their effect on the overall system, it is not likely that those processes will succeed. In
recognition of the fact that people are the key element to the success of any process
change, the Congress and the Department ofDefense promulgated a number of changes in
the career management of individuals involved in the acquisition process. These changes
have included implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA), the establishment of a consortium of acquisition schools under the leadership
ofthe Defense Acquisition University, and the Defense Management Review.
1. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
A possibly lasting change in the management of personnel involved in the
acquisition process has been the DAWIA. Although many studies previously conducted
on this issue proposed changes in the management of acquisition personnel, few succeeded
or carried the weight of change as the DAWIA. Signed into law by the President on
November 5, 1990, it brought together improvements previously only suggested by
studies such as the Packard Commission Report and the China Lake Demonstration
Project. [Ref. 2:p. 107-110]
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The DAWIA differed from previous legislative efforts in that it looked at
underlying weaknesses in the management of acquisition programs and identified
personnel education and training as the key. It avoided the common legislative remedy of
adding additional layers of management and oversight to correct previous failures in the
acquisition process. The general intent of DAWIA was to improve the acquisition
process by strengthening and improving the professionalism of the individuals responsible
for the process, the acquisition workforce. [Ref. 2:p. 107-1 10]
The DAWIA identified many problems in human resources management within
DoD. A principal weakness identified had to do with the short tenure of incumbent
acquisition personnel, a lack of career incentives, the inflexibility in the current civilian
personnel system and a lack of qualification standards for appointment to key acquisition
positions. Congress corrected many of these shortcomings by requiring the Secretary of
Defense to take several actions, the more significant include; (1) establish policies and
procedures to manage the acquisition workforce, (2) the establishment of an "acquisition
corps," and (3) the establishment of a Defense acquisition university structure. [Ref. 2:p.
109-110]
Although the requirements of DAWIA were far ranging, the actual effects on the
acquisition process are less well known. As of this writing, almost four years have passed
since the last mandatory provision ofDAWIA was enacted in 1993, yet the full effects are
not yet known. As with many Government process improvements, little effort was
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expended to establish the structures and mechanisms required to collect useful data and
identify emerging trends. [Ref. 19:p. 97]
2. The Defense Management Review (DMR)
The Defense Management Review was a response to a presidential directive in
National Security Review (NSR-11) to develop a plan for fully implementing the
recommendations of the Packard Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act. The DMR examined a broad range of issues within DoD and called
for management improvement actions in various areas.
Within the acquisition community, the DMR highlighted the need for improving
the human resource element. The DMR shared many of the improvements called for by
DAWIA with regard to personnel issues. It also called for the creation of "small, high
quality staffs" supported by strong initiatives to "reduce management layers, motivate
personnel, consolidate functions, and refocus attention on core functions. An objective of
achieving a 10 percent or $5 billion reduction in administrative cost was established."
[Ref 2: p. 112]
The effects of the DMR, as with DAWIA, with regard to the human resources
improvements are also unclear. Although it is a positive step, the actual results of any
process improvements are difficult to measure. Its focus may have been more on the
outcome than on the process itself
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D. LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS
In exercising its power of the sovereign, the Congress enacts various laws and
rules affecting the acquisition system and its process. These laws are normally interpreted
by executive agencies and promulgated in the form of regulation. Improvements in the
acquisition process must be consistent with the framework that the Congress establishes or
as a result of the statute enacted by Congress. Over the years Congress normally reacted
to real or perceived problems within the acquisition process by passing a variety of new
laws including the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) and the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act (FASA). Both of these have had an effect on the acquisition planning
process.
1. Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)
According to Sherman, the Competition in Contracting Act "deserves status as the
keynote for government procurement processes for the foreseeable future." Enacted into
law as Title VII of the Spending and Reduction Act of 1984, CICA set the stage for the
micromanagement of government procurement. CICA affected virtually all the
participants, both private and public, involved in procurement programs. [Ref. 2: p. 79]
Although CICA mandated many seemingly broad and encompassing changes to the
procurement process, perhaps its most significant impact was the congressional urging
that Federal agencies do a better job of planning and preparing for competitive
procurements. [Ref. 2:p. 81] As Nash contends, "Acquisition planning in many agencies
has historically been performed in a sporadic and fragmented manner. Any planning that
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occurred was often informal and haphazard—often dependent on the personnel involved."
[Ref. l:p. 9-10] Through CICA, Congress expressed its belief that procuring activities
"were not doing the kind of advanced thinking and planning necessary to achieve an
effective and efficient procurement process. . " where competition was believed to be the
key. [Ref. 2:p. 81]
The CICA requires that executive agencies "use advance procurement planning . . .
in preparing for the procurement of property or services." [Ref. l:p. 10] However, neither
CICA nor subsequent legislation defines what constitutes an advance procurement plan. 1
Federal regulatory bodies such as the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) have
promulgated the requirements for a formal acquisition plan in the FAR (Part 7), but these
only spell out documentation requirements. Additionally, Congress, through CICA, urged
Government procurement experts to find ways to simplify and streamline the existing
processes. However, CICA itselfmay be at odds with this declaration in that it includes a
significant increase in administrative requirements as well as new procedural rules. [Ref.
2:p. 82-83]
2. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA)
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 introduced changes described as
"sweeping" and "of paramount importance." [Ref. 2:p. 93] Signed into law by President
Clinton as a major element of his "Reinventing Government" initiative, FASA alters or
i
It should be noted that prior to CICA, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) did require Advanced Procurement Planning, but the extent to which it
was used is not known.
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affects some 225 provisions of law affecting the procurement process in Government.
Based on the work of the Packard Commission of 1986 and the Section 800 Panel Report
chartered by Congress in 1991, FASA introduces legislative changes that insert practical,
result oriented policies into the acquisition process. [Ref. 2:p. 92]
Among the more significant changes, FASA revised the traditional definition of
what constituted commercial products or items in an attempt to exclude these from
governmental bureaucracies and regulations. It also changed the Simplified Acquisition
Procedures (SAP) threshold to $100,000 from $25,000 and required agencies to develop
electronic commerce capabilities in order to retain use of these procedures in the future.
And, it established $500,000 as the threshold for requiring cost and pricing data. [Ref.
20:p. 15-17]
The real question at this point is to what extent will FASA improve the acquisition
planning process? A GAO report issued in 1996 indicates that while DoD is complying
with a majority of FASA's requirements, many civilian agencies may not be complying
with the act as originally intended. [Ref. 21 :p. 2-4]
E. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS
Sherman states that, "[t]he computerization of government procurement programs
has evolved slowly." He goes on to say that most advances in the automation of the
acquisition process are the result of individual effort and not the result of any significant
agency initiatives. From a policy point of view, more effort is devoted to "procurement
controls, ethics, policy, and audit than automation." The adoption of information
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technology by the government does not match the progress achieved by private industry.
[Ref. 2:p. 131]
Within many corporations, automated purchasing systems are integrated with
inventory, demand forecasting, scheduling, and distribution systems. These systems, in
most cases, far exceed what is available at most government organizations. For instance,
at Ford Motor Company, IT was the key enabler that allowed them to revamp their parts
procurement or acquisition process. It allowed them to reduce personnel in the
purchasing department from 500 to 125. This quantum leap in productivity would not be
possible without IT. [Ref. 5:p. 41-44]
1. Information Technology in Acquisition Planning
Within the Government acquisition environment, there seems to be a general
paucity of data concerning the use of IT in the acquisition planning process. This
researcher has found that searches of automated databases, the Internet and periodical
literature for information about application of IT to the Government acquisition process in
general yields little information. A similar search conducted on commercial systems yields
considerably more information.
Explanation for this occurrence may be two-fold. First, there is a tendency in
Governmental organizations to develop automated procurement systems at a level that
benefits top management. This is done to provide upper echelons with a comprehensive
management information system used in its oversight function. Secondly, automated
systems within Government were initially developed to compile statistical data as a means
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of proving compliance with various socio-economic programs. In either case, the impetus
to develop automated systems within the Government provided a different initial
motivation from that of the private corporations which have most always been driven by a
desire to increase productivity, and hence, profitability. [Ref. 2: p. 132]
2. Survey of Current IT System Capabilities and Applications
Only recently has the DoD begun to realize the importance of IT in the acquisition
planning process. In January 1995, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology (USD[A&T]) chartered an Automated Acquisition Information (AAI)
Process Action Team (PAT) to "define a vision and build a roadmap to institutionalize an
automated acquisition information process to provide current and comprehensive
information ... to effectively and efficiently buy weapon systems." This charter
recognized the need to apply IT to the DoD acquisition processes, but what was decidedly
unique about this PAT was its orientation across functional areas. For the first time, it
recognized the need to integrate program management, logistics, engineering, and finance
into the automation of the acquisition planning process. [Ref. 22:p. 26-27]
Another area of concern recognized by the AAI PAT was the lack of a list of
automated information software used in the acquisition process. Individual agencies often
develop unique software in support of their particular needs when information systems
may already exist that would satisfy that requirement. The result is the parallel and
duplicate development ofnumerous automated acquisition systems within the Government
acquisition community. To correct this deficiency, the AAI PAT recommended that the
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Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) PMA-250 collect information on all automated
systems used in the acquisition process. [Ref. 22: p 31]
A recent review (February 1997) of the Defense Acquisition Deskbook web site on
the Internet confirmed NAVAIR PMA-250's efforts to collect this data. Under a
Software Tool Information link, there was a listing of approximately 89 different
acquisition related software (Appendix B). This is consistent with a 1989 study conducted
by the Logistics Management Institute that identified 76 information systems supporting
DoD procurement organizations. [Ref. 23]
The PMA-250 list includes over 17 functional areas such as contract management,
program management, logistics, test and evaluation, engineering, and financial
management. Of these, there were approximately 49 systems that describe contract
management as one of the functional areas supported by that software. Briefly, 53
described program management, 30 logistics and 37 financial management.
The PMA-250 list, however, is not all inclusive and may only include DoD
software. A search of the Internet for acquisition planning tools resulted in several hits,
both commercial and private. Of these, the General Services Administration (GSA) Home
Page revealed a similar undertaking to locate and canvas agencies for software used in the
acquisition planning process. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) listed a system called the Acquisition Planning Expert (APEX)
that reportedly saved over six million dollars in five years of use. And, GSA reported the
use of a system called Transmitting Records Electronically and Quickly (TREK) that
30
reduced the number of document handoffs from 49 to 4, and reduced the days to process a
purchase request from 36 to 14.
3. Planned Improvements
The previously reported information does not include planned improvements.
Currently, the Defense Logistics Agency is undertaking the development of yet another
acquisition related software. Known as the Standard Procurement System (SPS), this
system is intended to replace legacy systems across the DoD and automate still existing
manual operations. This is an inherently complex task given that DoD procurement is
conducted at over 1500 contracting offices involving approximately 56,000 individuals.
[Ref. 23]
The Program Baseline Plan describes SPS as a system that will use "commercial
software which will form the basis for an automated DoD contracting system and employ
standard data and data transmissions within DoD and with industry." SPS will use an
open systems architecture with an underlying relational database and will be Electronic
Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI) capable. It will operate on a stand-
alone Personal Computer (PC), in a network environment, or in a "megacenter," and
includes hardware, training, maintenance, and deployment services. The system will be
capable of performing the full range of acquisition functions including procurement
planning, solicitation, contract award, and contract administration. The estimated
program cost is approximately $326 million and the life cycle cost through the year 2005
is $3,088 billion. [Ref. 24]
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One of the key goals of SPS is to standardize procurement processes within the
procurement functional area of the DoD. SPS satisfies this goal by embedding existing
procurement policies and procedures into a single automated system with a database
shareable by other DoD users and then replacing existing and legacy systems throughout
the DoD. By linking with other non-procurement legacy systems, such as existing
financial systems used by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), SPS will
hopefully ensure quicker and more accurate contract payments. [Ref. 23 :p. iii]
F. SUMMARY
Efforts at improving the acquisition process have not produced clear and easily
discernible results. Organizational changes, such as the recent development of IPTs, may
have only allowed acquiring agencies to keep up with rising work demands caused by the
increasing complexity of weapon systems. Changes to personnel requirements and
training have yet to produce any demonstrable results or improvements in the acquisition
process. Legislative improvements have been numerous, and in some cases far reaching,
but one cannot point to any substantial gain in productivity as a result. Various
technological improvements to the acquisition system have been attempted, but again with
uncertain or marginal success.
Given that all these efforts have failed to produce dramatic improvements in the
acquisition process, what avenues are left open? Organizational and personnel changes
may only be capable of producing so much given their physical limitations and finite
abilities. Legislative changes are top down approaches that many times impose more
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requirements than they eliminate, consume considerable time, and produce unpredictable
outcomes.
Information technology, though often seen as a panacea, has also failed to produce
substantial gains in productivity within Government. However, many private
corporations, constrained by some of the same organizational and personnel problems as
Government, have recently used IT to produce phenomenal improvements to their
processes. The following chapter examines the role of information technology and
suggest ways in which IT could be used for leverage to produce dramatic gains in
productivity in the acquisition process.
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IV. THE ROLE OF IT IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Defense planned to spend over $9 billion on Information
Technology (IT) and related services in 1996, over a third of the total Federal IT budget
of $26.5 billion. This does not include an estimated $24 billion to $32 billion that DoD
will spend for software embedded in major weapon systems. [Ref. 25: p. 3,10] But since
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not collect comprehensive budget
data on IT expenditures, the actual amount spent on IT may be unknown. Nor do
Government agencies, including DoD, break out IT obligations as separate line items in
budget submission. [Ref. 25:p. 3-4] However, the passage of the Information Technology
Management Reform Act (ITMRA) may have some future effect on these problems. [Ref.
26:p. 3]
The real question, however, is what impact has this voluminous spending had on
improving Government operations or processes? Little, if any, according to the General
Accounting Office (GAO). GAO states repeatedly that these information systems "cost
millions more than expected, take longer to compete than anticipated, and fail to produce
significant improvements in the speed, quality, or cost of federal programs." [Ref. 26:p. 2]
"Despite spending more than $200 billion on information management and systems in the
last 12 years, the government has too little evidence of meaningful returns." [Ref 27: p 3]
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The GAO is not alone in this assessment. The Software Technology Support Center
(STSC) states that [Ref. 28:p. 1-1]:
The software industry is reaching its 50 year mark, however, the
same problems that plagued us 20 years ago still persist. DoD has had a
distressing history of procuring elaborate, high-tech software-intensive
weapons that do not work, cannot be relied upon, modified, or maintained.
Many of these over budget, overdue programs have been canceled after
reaching full-scale production with millions of dollars wasted, and not a
single unit reaching the warfighters' hands. With virtually every
acquisition snafu, the software component can be isolated as the prime
source ofour dilemmas.
This problem is not unique to the DoD or even the Federal Government.
Currently, GAO reports that 11 federal agencies have significant problems with
information management systems under development and has labeled them as "high-risk."
These information systems are defined as high-risk "because they are especially vulnerable
to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement, and were potentially costing the government
billions of dollars without clear returns." [Ref. 25:pl2] The systems identified are key
elements of mission critical components that together represent a multibillion dollar
investment of scarce Government resources. One example, DoD's Corporate Information
Management (CEVI) initiative, is cited as consuming over $3 billion annually without
demonstrating any real benefit. [Ref. 25: p. 12-14]
B. RECURING FAILURES IN THE ACQUISITION OF IT
A more prominent, and consistent theme in the acquisition of IT is the repeated
failures that occur over time. As early as 1979, GAO reported that of the custom built
Management Information Systems (MIS) under development for governmental agencies,
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more than 60% had schedule overruns, over 50% had cost overruns, more than 45% of
the software could not be used for its intended purpose, and 29% was never even
delivered. Normally had such problems been publicly scrutinized, there would be an
intense effort to correct the problem. However, over the next 15 years the problem did
not go away. As shown in Table 1 (adapted from the STSC), these problems continue
through to the present. [Ref. 28:p. 1.3 - 1.6]
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GAO REPORT REPORT FINDING
Contracting for Computer Software Development: serious




Analysis of custom-built MIS systems (163 contractors and 113
Government personnel surveyed) produced the following results:
• +60% of contracts had schedule overruns
• +50% ofcontracts had cost overruns
• +45% of software was never delivered
• +19% of software had to be reworked to be used
• -3% of software had to be modified to be used
• -2% of software was unusable as delivered




• 64 (ofplanned 614) units delivered and subsequently
scrapped
• FOT&E results showed significant performance shortfalls
• Cost and schedule overruns projected ifgovernment
demanded required functionality
• $1.8 billion lost
• Program canceled




• $446.5 million (99..9%) projected cost overrun
• 5 year projected schedule overrun
• $230 million lost
• Program canceled
Embedded Computer Systems: Significant Software Problems
on C-17 Must Be Addressed
May 1992
(GAO/IMTEC-92-48)
• 2 years behind schedule (as ofMarch 1992)
• $1.5 billion cost overrun
• Software size/complexity underestimated
• MilStds waived for contractor with limited software
experience
• Shortcuts taken on software testing and software
supportability issues
Software Challenges in Mission Critical DoD Systems
December 24, 1992
(GAO/IMTEC-93-13)
1 5 major systems studied had the following common problems:
• Poor software engineering concepts, methods, and practices
used
• Proceeded despite serious problems
• Requirements were ill-defined and unstable
• Architectures were inflexible
• Security requirements not met
• Poor testing methods and procedures used
• No systems-level integration testing performed




• 8 years behind schedule (at time of report)
• $792 million over budget (at time ofreport)
• 11 years projected schedule slip
• $896 million projected budget overrun
• $22 million/year additional costs for continued
operation/maintenance of old system




• Cost tripled in 10 years (from $12.1 million in 1985 to $34.4
million in 1995, 1 85% cost increase)
• Software development and testing problems
• Required performance has been decreased by 74%
Table 1 - GAO Reports on DoD Software Failures
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In all fairness, these failures in the acquisition of IT are not strictly a DoD, or even
a Government, problem. A study conducted by IBM of 24 leading companies that were
developing large, software intensive systems, all suffered similar problems. Of these
commercial and state government entities, 55% had cost overruns, 68% had schedule
overruns and 88% had to be redesigned to be useable. Similarly, a third of all large-scale
IT programs are canceled and three quarters are operational failures. Table 2 lists some
major non-military IT acquisition failures. [Ref. 29: p. 88-89]
Year Project Results
1980s International Telegraph & Telephone
4 switching systems
• 40,000 function point system
• $500 million lost
• Canceled
1987 California Department of Motor
Automated Vehicle/Driver License
System
• 3 (5,000 function point size)
• $30 million lost
• Canceled
1989 State ofWashington
Automated Social Service Caseworker
System
• 7 years to build
• Failed to meet use needs




• $165 million lost
• Canceled
Table 2 - Major Non-Military Software Acquisition Failures
The preceding discussion may lead to the erroneous belief that all IT acquisitions
are failures. Several programs, including both Government and commercial, are IT
success stories. These include the IT portions of the Air Force's F-22 Advanced Tactical
Fighter Program and the Boeing Corporation's 777 passenger airplane. Additionally,
many companies successfully implement IT in their companies with dramatic
improvements in productivity and quality standards. [Ref. 28:p. 23-30] The real question
is— what defines and separates these organizations from others that failed?
39
C. IT TOOLS AND THE ACQUISITION PLANNING PROCESS
Over the last 12 years the Federal Government has spent over $200 billion on
information technology trying to correct efficiency problems. As previously discussed, the
results are disappointing and continue to this day. But what causes this failure when
government tries to implement information technology to improve its processes? Michael
Hammer provides a very succinct and powerful observation about how IT should be
applied: [Ref 5:p. 83]
A company that cannot change the way it thinks about information
technology cannot reengineer. A company that equates technology with
automation cannot reengineer. A company that looks for problems first
and then seeks technology solutionsfor them cannot reengineer.
The solution within an organization begins with first understanding the capabilities
of information technology. This understanding need not be in depth or extreme, but rather
a generic understanding of what tools a particular technology or application brings to the
process table. All this understanding must do is establish a connection between a process
objective and the IT tool that will enable its accomplishment. What is most important to
remember about information technology is that it is a "means of solving business
problems, not technologies looking for uses." [Ref. 30:p. 55]
The Federal Government may now just be realizing this lesson. Recent legislative
efforts including the Paperwork Reduction Act and the Ginger-Cohen Act of 1996
emphasize the meeting of agency goals through the effective use of IT. The Ginger-
Cohen Act: [Ref. 31:p. 9]
[EJxplicitly requires agency heads to analyze the mission of their
organizations, benchmark and assess the performance of their business
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processes and, based on this analysis, redesign their mission-related and
administrative processes (as appropriate) before making significant
investments in information technology to support those missions. In plain
terms, agencies should maximize the potential of technology to improve
performance, rather than simply automating inefficientprocesses.
The real influence of information technology on the acquisition planning process
potentially lies in its "disruptive power." Leveraging this power requires that long
established, traditional rules about how work is done be broken. This "breaking of the
rules" allows individuals to begin to think inductively about how to apply technology
during the reengineering process. Only then can these long standing work rules, on which
the underlying process was built, be changed to take advantage of the full power of IT.
Breaking the old rules creates the possibility for new ways of working and with that
reengineering can begin. [Ref.5:p. 91]
Information technology is the essential enabler to reengineering because it allows
business processes to be redesigned. Merely throwing computers and software at an
existing process does not constitute reengineering. Many times automation only
reinforces old, often outdated, ways of doing business. Nothing new was created. If what
was being done was wrong in the past, it is now being done wrong even faster. This,
combined with the inherent complexity of the existing business process, is a certain recipe
for failure. In fact, the misuse of technology may actually block any anticipated
improvements in performance and reinforce old ways of thinking and undesirable
behavioral patterns. If we take it as a given that IT is misapplied to business processes,
then how is this corrected? [Ref. 5:p. 83-84]
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Hammer provides eight key examples of how to improve business processes with
technology. Although not all inclusive, the elements in these examples break existing





Wireless data communications and portable computers
Interactive video disk
Automatic identification and tracking technology
High performance computing.
None of these technologies are new or startling. But if used correctly, they are the
enablers that foster process innovation. It is the critical element in creating a new way of
viewing an existing process. [Ref. 5: p. 92-99]
1. Shared Databases
A considerable portion of modern day business processes are a reflection of pre-
automation paper "shuffling" techniques. The structure of many business processes was
originally developed around the file folder. Information was captured on paper and
distribution limited to those who possessed the folder. It was thought that copying
machines would solve this problem but they probably exacerbated it by creating multiple
copies of different versions of the same file. [Ref 5: p. 92]
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Another result is that many business processes tend to be structured in a sequential
nature. Information gets passed from one individual to the next, with the first individual
failing to see what later edits accomplished. Information technology did not solve this
problem for most. Word processors replaced typewriters, but the paper trail remained.
The implicit rule is that information can appear in only one place at one time. [Ref.5 :p.
92]
An example of this may be Navy acquisition plans. The Navy Acquisition Planning
Guide (APG) specifies that "[t]he AP shall be limited to 25 pages. . . " and that this page
limit ". . . is to be exceeded only in exceptional cases." The approximately 100 or more
program plans (Appendix C) that are incorporated into the AP are done by reference only.
These additional plans are maintained apart from the AP. In no one place can the whole
acquisition plan be viewed. [Ref.32]
This is very interesting when it is considered that the APG states that the ". . . AP
defines the structure of the program throughout its acquisition cycle." It also states that
"[acquisition planning is the process by which the resources and efforts of key personnel
responsible for the acquisition are coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive
plan ..." Given this preamble, and the actual makeup of the plan, it is questionable if the
two can ever be reconciled to achieve the goal of ". . . fulfilling the agency need in an
effective and timely manner, and at a reasonable cost." [Ref. 32]
However, information technology could potentially change this approach. Shared
databases allow information to appear in as many places as it is needed, simultaneously.
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Any number of people can share this information. Acquisition plans need not incorporate,
by reference, other plans. Nor do the plans have to be subdivided. The database itself
may now become the plan. Instead of the process being fragmented by territorial and
inter-organizational competition, all efforts are directed at the same goal, maintaining the
acquisition plan as it was originally intended, as a coordination and integration tool.
2. Expert Systems
Expert systems use business rules and problem solving techniques along with
databases to evaluate situations or determine courses of action. These systems are
designed specifically to capture and apply consistently the expertise of a human specialist
in a particular field. Expert systems are usually very powerful, but limited in their scope of
application. Examples currently in use are medical diagnosis, manufacturing quality
control and financial management. [Ref 33: p. 494]
Many existing information systems may have expert systems imbedded in them as
part of a transaction processing system or it may be as simple as a terminal where users
query the system for answers. At the heart of expert systems is a database of rules called a
knowledge base. These are typically a set of instructions stated in an 'TF-THEN" format.
For example, it might say; If the price is under $2,500, then check to see if a credit card
was used to buy the item. [Ref. 33 :p. 494-495]
Expert systems first became widely available in the 1980's. At that time, most
considered them primarily as a means of replacing costly and sophisticated experts with
cheap machines. However, that reality did not come to be. What did transpire was that it
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allows relatively unskilled employees to now operate at nearly the level of the highly
trained expert. What this implies is that one generalist supported by expert systems can
potentially do the work of many specialists. Now, instead of having several individuals
each trained to do a specific function, one individual, called a case worker, can accomplish
all the functions.
At first, this may not seem like a major accomplishment, but consider what
happens in a highly sequential administrative process. Previously, each worker
accomplished one part and then passed it to the next person to accomplish their part. Any
one who has dealt with a bureaucracy knows that each step adds considerable time to the
process. If at any point work must be rerouted back in the chain, it becomes even longer.
Each handoffor error adds even more time to the process. [Ref.5:p. 92]
The above description substantially illustrates the acquisition planning process for
a major weapon system. Many of the improvements discussed in Chapter III alleviated
some of the delays and bureaucracies associated with the acquisition process, but none
have dramatically increased the productivity of the process. New project management
organizations, IPTs, legislation, and numerous other efforts have been attempted, but none
as of yet have resulted in a significant improvement in procurement lead times. Some have
made coordination easier, provided better visibility over projects, or even brought better
people to the existing process, but none have had the impact that the application of expert
systems could provide.
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Expert systems have the potential to dramatically reduce the time element
associated with acquisition planning by eliminating handoffs, delays and errors that cause
rework. A single "case worker" could manage an entire acquisition plan backed up by an
expert system and a database. This case worker would be responsible to the PM for the
entire acquisition planning process, from beginning to end. Less time or effort would be
expended on passing plans back and forth, going to endless meetings, and doing another
iteration of a plan that is already out of date.
3. Decision Support Tools
A technology closely related to expert systems is Decision Support Systems
(DSS). Decision support systems, like expert systems, are designed to assist and support
the user in the decision process, except the DSS is used in situations where the decision
process is relatively unstructured and only part of the information needed is structured in
advance. The significance of the DSS is that it allows the structuring of the problem by
providing needed information, much like advanced help programs in commercial software
programs. The difference though is that DSS may, because of the nature of the problems
it is used in, require the system to retrieve and process data from several files and
databases. It may also use information provided online by individual decision makers in
the decision process.
Information requested from a DSS are not presented in pre-formatted reports.
Instead, each query generates its own unique output in a format determined by the
recipients at the time of need. Typically, queries to the DSS are structured as questions
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such as, "How will changing the requirement from 400 aircraft to 380 affect the overall
price of the program?" As can be seen from this simple question, the ability to query the
system makes it possible to model very complex problems with many inter-related issues.
[Ref 33 :p. 487-488]
One of the appurtenances of the industrial age in modern organization is
hierarchical decision making. This exists because workers are expected to do only one job
and not think or make decisions about it. All decisions are referred up the ladder because
managers, with their broader views, are the only ones that have the perspective necessary
to make informed decisions. However, it is costly, especially within Government, to retain
decision making authority at higher levels. [Ref. 5:p. 95-96]
In a memo by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Dr.
Paul Kaminski stated that "[u]nnecessary layers of review should be eliminated and the
decision making authority maintained at a lower level more familiar with the details of the
acquisition." [Ref. 34] This statement suggests that decisions should be made at the
lowest level consistent with regulation. However, the empowerment of individuals to
make decisions cannot be achieved only by conferring the authority to make decisions. It
must also be accompanied with the information necessary to make those decisions.
Modern DSS combined with database technology can provide information
previously only available to higher level managers. Lower level personnel, properly
trained, and employing easy to use analysis and modeling tools can make sophisticated
decisions in support of the planning process. This capability allows decision making to be
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retained at the lowest level possible. Decisions are made much quicker and are resolved
when they appear in the process, not when they are noticed by higher management. [Ref.
5:p. 95-96]
4. Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI)
EC/EDI is a form of electronic communications that allows trading partners to
exchange business transactions, such as purchase orders, in a form that can be readily
processed by application software. Approximately one third of all business documents
(invoices, payments, etc.) are transmitted by EC/EDI. One of the advantages inherent in
EC/EDI is its ability to reduce the time needed to complete business transactions and to
obtain the goods and services an organization requires. [Ref 33 :p. 372]
Within the Government, EC/EDI is becoming increasingly important. FASA
provided an incentive for all procuring agencies to start using EC/EDI by raising the
ceiling for purchases allowed under small purchase rules to $100,000 from $25,000.
However, FASA provides a lower, interim threshold of $50,000 premised on whether
agencies can verify that they are performing 75% of their contracting actions using
EC/EDI methods. [Ref. 39:p. 19]
By itself, EC/EDI may contribute little to improving the acquisition planning
process. While it may provide more opportunities to increase efficiency in small purchase
scenarios, in larger transactions it may become less important. It may still prove useful in
coordinating acquisition planning over geographically dispersed sites and in the
identification of potential sources of supply. However, the real innovation that is possible
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with EC/EDI is in combining it with other process changes that lead up to the electronic
transaction. [Ref. 30:p. 60-61]
5. Work Flow Systems
A relatively new appearance in information technology is the workflow system.
Workflow systems take the paper forms and documents an organization uses in its day-to-
day business processes and automates them using IT. By doing this, it captures the
policies and procedures of the business into electronic forms that can then be filled,
processed, authorized, and routed by various workers. Workflow automates the flow of
information within the business or organization. [Ref. 35:p. vii]
Initially, workflow systems were developed for converting paper documents to
electronic form with scanning systems and then either storing them for later retrieval or
transmitting them electronically with rudimentary e-mail systems. It was thought this
would lead to a "paperless" environment. What actually occurred was that information
generated on paper often exist simultaneously in electronic media, leading to the
proliferation of more paper. [Ref. 35 :p 214-215]
The new generation of highly sophisticated workflow systems have similar goals,
but the starting point, assumptions and impacts are entirely different. Early workflow
systems attempted to automate existing paper-based business processes, there was no
attempt to review the underlying process itself. Modern day workflow still has some of
the concerns associated with imaging, but now the focus is on redesigning the process
before implementing workflow systems. Workflow systems are tools that may allow
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reengineering to take place, but it is not an inherent solution to business process problems.
Rather, a business process should be evaluated and workflow technology inserted only //it
brings about the desired change or improvement in that process. [Ref. 35:p. 209]
Within the acquisition planning process, the use of workflow systems is not clear.
A review of systems being used indicates that some packages may have this capability
because of the underlying commercial software that is used. For instance, the Master
Acquisition Planning Program (MAPP) may have workflow capability because it utilizes
Microsoft Word as the underlying software. [Ref. 6] Word provides a basic routing
capability that when combined with e-mail allows the originator to control the process that
the document goes through. [Ref. 36:p. 329]
Recent literature now suggests the use of workflow systems as a means of
reengineering a part of the acquisition process, specifically the development ofRequest for
Proposals (RFP). As envisioned, the RFP process would be supported by a workflow
system combined with a shared database. There, work documents would be indexed and
stored for retrieval and transmitted using an electronic communication such as e-mail to
various workers involved in the RFP process. [Ref. 3 7: p. 92]
What really makes this a robust and vital workflow scheme is its definition and
control over the RFP process. "[T]he sequence of steps and agents involved in a process
is generally enumerated beforehand, and used to automatically route work to the proper
agent, when the work is required to be completed." [Ref. 37:p. 92] Additionally,
templates are available "that describe the overall flow ofwork in a process, along with on-
50
line process "help" and reference information (e.g., regulations, contract clauses, etc.)."
[Ref. 37:p. 92] This technology is readily available commercially and easily adaptable to
Government use. However, it is expensive and requires an investment in personnel
training. None the less, the decision has been made to invest in this technology by some
Government organizations. [Ref. 3 7: p. 92-93]
D. SUMMARY
The Federal Government's investment in Information Technology is, and has been,
nothing less than staggering by any estimate. The yield on this investment is questionable
at best. Over a third of all information technology projects are never delivered. Those
that are delivered will likely be over schedule and over budget. And, of those that are
delivered, many are unusable for their intended purposes and require considerable redesign
to be useful.
At least part of this information technology crisis may be a result of how agencies
view technology. Many see IT as a way to automate existing processes and never
question this assumption. Others fail to recognize the solutions that IT presents or to take
advantage of what this could do change long standing administrative processes.
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V. PATHOLOGIES OF THE ACQUISITION PLANNING PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, there has been an increasing demand for a smaller
Government that provides improved services at a lower cost. Making Government more
effective and efficient has become a national issue. [Ref. 26:p. 2] Part of the problem is
that many of the largest Federal agencies "find themselves encumbered with structures and
processes, aimed at the demands of earlier times, and designed before modern information
and communications technology came into being." [Ref. 38:p. 6] If this is true, then the
current acquisition process may have some of these pervasive and systemic problems, or
pathologies, that can be easily identified.
B. PATHOLOGIES IN THE ACQUISITON PLANNING PROCESS
In describing opportunities to use IT during process innovation, Davenport
identifies several pathologies that are present in existing business processes. His
discussion is premised on the basis that before a process is redesigned, it must be
understood what effect IT can have on the process and where this effect is felt the most.
In other words, what underlying symptom would benefit the most from the intelligent
application of IT. [Ref. 30:p. 50]
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1. Labor and Paper Intensive Activities
Perhaps one of the more recognized benefits of automation is its ability to
eliminate or reduce human labor. Although this element is more frequently seen with the
automation of manufacturing processes, it is also associated with administrative processes
as well. However, in administrative and service environments, processes are frequently, if
not routinely, defined by the existing document flow. The introduction of IT, at a
minimum, provides the opportunity to remove the paper from the process by employing
work flow tools that define the paths an electronic document takes through the process.
This in turn may significantly reduce the need for some human labor at every step and
increase productivity. [Ref 30:p. 51]
Another benefit of the impact of IT on the process is the structure it lends to that
process. Regardless of whether the administrative process is efficient or not, it is now
probable that automation will cause it to be done the same way every time. The process is
now better defined with less handoffs and passing of documents. [Ref. 30: p. 51]
Within the acquisition process, program managers are facing a challenge of
maintaining high levels of service to customers while simultaneously increasing staff
productivity. As previously seen in Chapter III, ". . . changes to the acquisition process
alone have not gone far enough to raise staff productivity. Increasingly, program
managers must turn to technology to help solve the problem." [Ref. 39:p. 19]
Even acquisition processes that are currently considered well managed may still be
too labor intensive and paper based. A recent study of the Request for Proposal (RFP)
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process by Nissen concluded that "the baseline RFP process represents a labor-intensive,
linear sequence of manual, paper-based activities that are interspersed between numerous
handoffs and reviews." [Ref. 37:p. 91]
2. Capturing Information
Not only can IT reduce or eliminate human labor from a process, it can also
augment the effort. If IT is exploited to capture information about process performance,
then that information can be analyzed to determine what improvements or changes are
required to optimize performance. This analysis can be done by individuals involved in
managing the process or may be done by other IT tools such as expert or decision support
systems. [Ref. 30:p. 51]
As shown in previous chapters, many procurement organizations seldom use
information about process to improve productivity. The result of this is that information,
or metrics, critical to the effective operation of contracting organizations is not available.
Generally, these organizations rely upon "their staffs to use their memories to handle the
next acquisition 'just like they did the last one." [Ref. 4:p. 378] The overall effect is that
management and acquisition process owners may lack the information necessary to
improve the quality, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. [Ref. 4: p.
378]
At NAVAIR, a review of AP and related procurement process instructions yields
little information about automated systems used to capture information about the process.
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Mention is made of four different automated systems associated with the procurement































Table 3 - AP Related Systems
Of interest is that most, if not all of these systems, capture very little information about the
structure of the acquisition process. Information is collected on the overall time a
program take to complete (PMIS), or where a document is in the review chain (Bar Code
System), but none appear to manage or help direct the flow of the process.
3. Sequential Processes
One of the primary benefits of defining a given process is that the flow can better
be examined for opportunities to reduce sequential paths. Within predominately
administrative systems, IT can significantly reduce cycle time and substantially increase
productivity by allowing some previously sequential steps to be performed in parallel. It
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also makes it easier to identify bottlenecks created by sequential work flows and provides
a means for reconfiguring around these bottlenecks. [Ref. 30:p. 52]
Since "most administrative systems are characterized by a mode of operation in
which work flows in a serial fashion. .
.
," it is likely that many acquisition processes suffer
from this same problem. [Ref. 4: p. 378-379] Given this understanding, it becomes more
clear why IT often does not produce the large productivity increases that were originally
anticipated. Many government contracting organizations "attempt productivity
advancements through investments in technology without examining the basic interoffice
communications processes. Senior leadership is left questioning the value of new
technology following marginal increases in productivity. If the 'paper process' is broken
before technology insertion, the 'paperless process' will also be broken." [Ref. 39:p. 22]
4. Analysis of Information
As previously noted, expert systems and DSS are having a considerable impact on
the analysis of information. IT can now support the decision making process in ways not
widely available even ten years ago. Numerous private corporations are now routinely
using expert systems to make decisions ranging from whether to extend credit to a
customer to what any given customer should pay for insurance. Many are also using the
power of these systems to collect, analyze and distribute information to key management
personnel. Many are reporting that managers' understanding of the business are
substantially improved and a dramatic reduction in time spent on routine meetings. [Ref.
30:p. 52-53]
57
Based on the information in Table 3, it appears to the researcher that little analysis
is done by any expert system or DSS. Nowhere in the relevant instructions does it discuss
the application of information provided by such an automated system. Nor does it instruct
PMs or PEOs to collect such information for analysis by any system. [Refs. 46,47,48]
5. Database Integration
One of the more critical aspects of IT on processes is its ability to integrate
information. In the future, it may become increasingly difficult to radically improve
process performance for tasks that are highly segmented. One of the reasons these tasks
remain segmented is that information on various processes are stored in several databases
throughout an organization. This splitting of process information throughout the
organization precludes anything but incremental improvements in processes because of the
complexity of dealing with all those databases. Organizations that opt for more
conservative approaches, that are incremental in nature, may find themselves increasingly
behind when competing with others who have achieved radical redesign of processes.
[Ref. 30:p. 53-54]
This problem of integration applies to the acquisition planning process as well. As
shown in Table 3, numerous databases are used just in the AP process. And, as was
previously noted in Chapter III, over 80 types of acquisition software are currently in use
within DoD. In fact, several of these may be in use in the same office. As has been
observed, "[t]he typical program office has a mixture of automation technologies." [Ref.
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39:p. 20] To add to this problem, many program offices may not have established
procedures for managing all of these IT resources effectively. [Ref. 3 9: p. 20]
6. Expert Knowledge of Processes
One ofthe greatest assets of any organization is the knowledge and experience of
the people who make up that organization. However, many times the knowledge and
experience these personnel possess is not well managed. Part of the reason is that
common wisdom may hold that knowledge intensive activities are not viewed as
processes. However, a number of private corporations are capturing this knowledge using
IT and making it readily available to the rest of the company. The goal of this undertaking
is to make expert knowledge readily available to the entire company. [Ref. 30:p. 54]
Within DoD, this intellectual vision may be taking shape. The Defense Acquisition
Deskbook (DAD) is "an automated reference tool providing the full complement of
acquisition information 'at the fingertips' of the acquisition profession." [Ref. 40:p. 40]
The DAD provides information on several levels. First it provides current mandatory
DoD regulations that must be followed. Then it provides discretionary information and
guidance where mandatory regulation leaves off. It also provides an information structure
where innovative practices, practical advice and lessons learned can be reviewed. Finally,




The business processes in many organizations have evolved over time. Many of
these broke down the process into discrete tasks so that the paperwork aspects could be
more easily managed. The introduction of rudimentary IT did not improve performance,
and may actually have hurt it, because it was added over the existing paper based process.
Within the acquisition planning process, as with most administrative systems, the
file folder has driven the development of many processes. The result is that most of the
processes tend to be highly sequential in nature and repetitious. Information must be sent
through the sequence over and over again for all individuals to have a chance to perform
their edit. It also has limited the size and complexity of documents. Many are split into
several individual folders or files when in reality it would make more sense to combine and
integrate them.
Another problem has been the inability of administrative systems to capture the
knowledge and expertise of its members, to help them make decisions about it, or the
sharing of this information with other administrative systems. Regulations and instructions
attempt to do this but are only as good as the human memory. Organization innovations
such as IPTs and matrix organizations may have only helped marginally. Decision making
is still retained at higher levels, even while that higher level exhorts decisions to be made
at the lower levels.
Recent developments in information technology over the last several years added
new capabilities that need to be revisited with respect to administrative processes. In the
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strictly paper environment, information was limited in how it could be manually distributed
and copied. The introduction of databases allows information to be available in several
places at the same time. Expert systems and decision support systems change the way in
which the information can be analyzed and decisions made. Workflow packages can
overview and help define key document processes.
These changes in technology require that the acquisition planning process must be
looked at anew. What previously made sense from an organizational point ofview may no
longer work. In fact, the misapplication of these technologies may prevent the
fundamental changes that are required to achieve dramatic improvements in the acquisition
planning process.
All of the above points to an acquisition planning system that is still highly
bureaucratic, plagued by paper and still highly sequential even in the best of organizations.
For example, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), a premier contracting
organization, devotes one publication of well over 300 pages to document the RFP
process as it currently exists. [Ref. 13:p. i] However, an extensive review by the
researcher reveals that only 3 out of 21 chapters (26 of 300 plus pages) deal even
nominally with the process. The vast majority of this publication explains, block by block,
how to fill out all of the paperwork required to support the RFP.
No amount of training on this publication could substantially improve the RFP
process. No matter how well written or organized, this publication could not materially
affect the process other than to document it at a given point in time. To achieve order-of-
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magnitude improvements, it is necessary to reengineer this process using information
technology as the essential enabler.
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VI. REDESIGNING THE ACQUISITION PLANNING PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The primary goal of the Department of Defense is maintaining a strong national
defense. To achieve that goal the DoD must maintain a strong business operation that is
capable of effectively and efficiently supporting the warfighter. Acquisition reform is a
key link in this support issue. Placing innovative and technologically superior weapons in
the hands of that warfighter, within an austere and shrinking Federal budget, will be an
extremely daunting task.
Accomplishing this task will require new approaches. Dr. William Perry, former
Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated 14 September 1994, remarked that "[t]he
private sector has found that attacking business-process cycle times is a powerful weapon
in its reengjneering arsenal which generates more efficient processes, greater product
quality and improved organizations for less cost." Dr. Perry was convinced that focusing
on cycle time reductions would result in "substantial gains in . . . reducing infrastructure,
streamlining and improving customer service." To accomplish this reduction in cycle time,
Dr. Perry challenged the Military Departments to reduce cycle time "by at least 50 percent
by the year 2000." [Ref 41]
But, as was seen in Chapter III, various attempts to improve the acquisition
process have not produced substantial or definite results. These resorts to "business as
usual" may not prove effective in the developing austere fiscal environment. Nor has
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information technology alone, as described in Chapter IV, proven to be the "silver bullet"
needed to achieve the substantial gains in productivity currently being sought. The
pathologies associated with the acquisition process, as presented in Chapter V, are still
prevalent and among us.
However, if we are still intent on radically improving the acquisition process (a
50% improvement in cycle times appears to be radical), then we must attempt new
approaches. It is the point of this paper to suggest that redesigning the acquisition
planning process to take advantage of the enabling power of information technology is at
least part of this productivity problem. It is understood that IT, in and of itself, cannot
change the process alone. Other human and organizational factors will have to be
considered. But an understanding of the existing acquisition process may suggest avenues
for the introduction of IT into that process. [Ref 30:p. 17]
B. DEFINING THE EXISTING ACQUISITION PLANNING PROCESS
Several writers on Business Process Reengineering (BPR) have expressed the
importance ofunderstanding existing processes before designing a new one. [Ref 4, 5, 30,
35] Some may argue that the essence of reengineering is starting over with a clean sheet
of paper so as not to be hampered by preconceived assumptions. However, Davenport
provides four basic reasons for defining an existing process before designing a new one.
[Ref. 30:p. 137]
First, the very act of defining the process serves to stimulate understanding and
communication among the participants of the redesign. It provides a common ground that
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all can agree upon as a starting point. This can become particularly important when the
process is relatively unstructured or when individuals find it difficult to even view their
work as a process. Secondly, in most complex organizations, such as the DoD, there may
be simply no other way to migrate to a new process without defining and understanding
the existing process. [Ref. 30:p. 137- 138]
Third, understanding the existing problems in a process can ensure that they are
not repeated in the redesign process. This has routinely happened with the automation of
an existing process that had not been sufficiently defined (hence, "paving the cowpaths").
Not realizing that the existing process is highly sequential may result in the same after
redesign. As a corollary, endemic problems may frequently go unnoticed until the entire
process is thoroughly studied. Defining the process will most likely identify pathologies
not previously understood or noticed. [Ref. 30:p. 138]
And, most critically, understanding and defining the current process will provide a
measure against which the redesigned process can be valued. The existing process allows
the collection of data for a baseline against which to measure the redesign objective. For
example, in the acquisition process this would be a time measure of the Procurement
Administrative Lead Time (PALT) before and after redesign. [Ref. 30:p. 138]
1. Federal Acquisition Processes
To begin to understand the existing acquisition planning process for a major
weapon system, the researcher first looked at the guidance provided by policy or
procedure. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A- 109 provides the
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basic policy to be followed by executive branch agencies in the acquisition of a major
program. In setting the acquisition policy, it only defines "the rules or guidelines that
express the limits within which action should occur." [Ref. 42. p. 4] OMB does not
specify any process, or procedure, for the acquisition of a weapon system; it only sets
broad policy requirement within which agencies must act. [Ref. 43]
The FAR, at Parts 7 and 34, begins many of its discussions on acquisition planning
with procedures2 . Part 34 "describes acquisition policies and procedures [emphasis
added] for use in acquiring major systems consistent with OMB Circular No. A- 109."
Although Part 34 directs agencies to "establish written procedures" for the acquisition of
major weapon systems, it does little in the way of actually presenting a defined process for
the acquisition of those system. At best, it is a policy document in that it provides limits
within which program managers and contracting officers should act. FAR Part 34 also
directs the program manager to prepare an Acquisition Plan (AP) in accordance with Part
7.
The acquisition planning as defined by the FAR at Part 7 is a "process by which the
efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and integrated
through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a
reasonable cost." But in the actual delineating of procedure (Section 7.104, General
2
Before going any farther it may be useful to differentiate between process and procedure. The American Heritage Dictionary defines a process
as a "series of actions, changes, or functions bringing about a result." It similarly defines procedure as a "series of steps taken to accomplish an
end." As can be seen from the definitions, both could be used interchangeably. For the purposes of this research, both are considered essentially
the same, differentiated only in that a procedure could be considered a part of a larger process.
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Procedures), it only states three actual steps a planner need take; 1) form a team, 2)
consult with requirements or logistics personnel, 3) coordinate and secure concurrence
with the contracting officer. Other than that it does not provide any procedures or
processes in developing a plan. What it does provide is policy guidance on the content of
theAP.
2. DoD Acquisition Processes
Within the DoD, the DoD Directive 5000 series provides policy and procedures
for the acquisition of major weapon systems. The March 15, 1996 update broke the DoD
5000 into two parts while "significantly reducing] the length and complexity." DoD
Directive 5000.1 is a discretionary document specifically directed at providing "general
principles to guide all defense acquisition programs." As such, it is strictly a policy
document and differs from the DoD Directive 5000.2R which "establishes mandatory
procedures" for major weapon system programs.
Part 1 of the DoD 5000.2R provides an overall acquisition management process
for the DoD. It defines in broad, overall phases the process a weapon system would take
from the determination of a need through the disposal of the system. Follow on parts of
the DoD 5000.2R, though entitled Program Definition, Program Structure, and Program
Design, provide more on policy issues than the actual process.
However, much of this may be by design. The DoD 5000. 1 enjoins "Program
Managers and other participants in the defense acquisition process" to turn to the Defense
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Acquisition Deskbook (DAD) for "assistance in implementing guiding principles and
mandatory procedures."
The DAD is currently managed by the Joint Program Office (JPO) located at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. The DAD is a two part automated tool ofDoD
acquisition information. A reference library contains the FAR, DFARS and DoD 5000
series documents along with every supporting document or statute. The information
structure contains discretionary guidance accessed via the topic or the process. [Ref. 40: p.
41]
The process portion of the DAD provides information on the actual steps in the
acquisition process. This process information can be accessed via graphical interface in a
"point and click" mode. Information on the process flow is numbered according to steps
and the level of refinement. For example, process information is initially broken down into
















Figure 1- DAD Acquisition Process
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Each subsequent block can then be broken down farther to define the process
below it. Under the block labeled 1.2 in Figure 1, Plan Acquisition and Management
Strategies, several more blocks then define the next steps. The following steps are then
laid out sequentially:
1.2.1 Develop Management Strategy
1.2.2 Develop Acquisition Strategy
1 .2.3 Determine Program Baseline
1.2.4 Establish Risk Management Plan
1.2.5 Document Required Program Information
1.2.6 Review and Approve Plans and Resources
After this point, in addition to being sequential, the diagram is setup so that every
step after the first one (1.2.1) flows into every step after it (1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, etc.).
Because of this interconnection between every step, the flowchart loses some of its ability
to portray the actual process except in the broadest sense. This pattern is repeated down
to three or four levels under each basic step. However, it is still very much a macro
overview of the acquisition process and does not substantially define the acquisition
planning process. [Ref. 44]
3. Naval Air Systems Command Acquisition Processes
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) in 1993 managed approximately
17.3 billion dollars in contracts distributed in over 200 programs. NAVAIR employs over
47,000 military and civilian personnel and is currently headquartered in Washington, DC.
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Additionally, it is located at 18 major technology and engineering centers, test and
evaluation facilities, depots, and logistics support activities nationwide. Its primary
mission is to deliver and support aircraft and related systems which can be operated,
based, and sustained at sea. Life cycle support is provided for: [Ref. 45]
• Carrier and other air capable ship based aircraft and systems.
• Integrated air antisubmarine warfare and antisurface warfare mission systems.
• Marine expeditionary forces aviation systems.
• Maritime air launched and strike weapons.
• Training systems for aircrew and maintenance personnel.
The acquisition process for the development, production and support of these
weapon systems is extremely complex and lengthy. To manage this process, NAVAIR
provides its program managers with several sources of guidance. The NAVAIR
Acquisition Guide (AG) is designed to provide "corporate management with a single
consolidated overview of the major internal NAVAIR acquisition processes." [Ref. 46:p.
1] As such it attempts to consolidate in one document all the activities, regulatory
guidance, and documentation requirements needed in assisting acquisition managers to
plan ahead. It is felt that the need for "program managers, particularly new managers, to
know the process and sequence of events and average time to complete events is essential
for planning their programs. . ." [Ref. 46: p. 1] Additionally, it states very succinctly the
motivation behind this focus on process:
In addition, corporate management, by seeing the entire process,
can focus on better ways to manage that process by minimizing the
number of program reviews, maximizing parallel vice serial
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documentation reviews, establishing time limits for each part of the
acquisition process, and providing a feedback system for performance
measurement against established time standards.





2. Milestone Review/Approval process.
3 Program Authorization process.
4. Procurement process.
Of these, the procurement process is most relevant to this research In general, it
interfaces the program initiation process, is an integral part of the Milestone
Review/Approval process, and includes the program authorization process. As can be
seen from the flow chart in Appendix D, the procurement process begins with the
identification of a requirement and generally ends with the release of a solicitation. Within
the procurement process is the development of the Acquisition Plan (AP). [Ref. 47:
enclosure (1)]
The NAVAIR AG defines the AP as the "principal document for in-depth program
planning, review, and oversight." [Ref. 46: p. 28] In support of this requirement,
NAVAIR issued a separate instruction, NAVAIR Instruction 4200.36 of 26 January 1994
to provide guidance on the preparation of APs. As shown by the flow chart in Appendix
E, it also provides a macro overview of the actual process necessary for the preparation of
the AP. The AP process, as shown, is divided into two major phases. [Ref. 48]
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In Phase I, the PM designates an AP Action Officer and an AP Preparation Team
that will prepare the draft AP for review. This team consists of a minimum of eight
personnel from most of the functional areas within the NAVAIR organization such as
contracting, engineering, business-financial management, training and so forth. It is their
responsibility to coordinate the input for each section of the AP from the various
functional codes within NAVAIR. Below this level, the process is not broken down
further. In Phase II, the completed draft AP is sent back out for extensive review by a
minimum of 27 different functional areas within NAVAIR. Again, how the review process
flows is not shown in the literature. However, it does suggest that both reviews are
conducted by individuals who then return their comments to Action Officer who
incorporates comments as received. [Ref. 48:p. 5-7, enclosure (5)]
This review is conducted in a strictly paper mode. Numerous copies are dispersed
throughout the organization for review and comment as required by instruction. To
control the flow of paper, an automated bar code system named the Acquisition Document
Processing and Tracking System (Bar Code System) is used. This system provides
"couriers to hand deliver draft copies of unclassified AP's to those codes required to
review and comment . . . plus any additional codes that the acquisition manager wants to
have involved in the AP review." [Ref. 48:p. 7]
At the end of Phase II, comments are reviewed and resolved by the PM. In some
cases, major issues may surface and require resolution at a higher level. If all issues are
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resolved at the PM level, the AP is approved and signed by the PM, PCO, Assistant
Commander for Contracts, and the Program Executive Officer (PEO). [Ref. 48:p. 7-8]
The time frame for each step varies. As Table 4 shows, the development, review
and approval ofthe AP requires a minimum of 108 days to complete and can go to greater
than 163 days. [Ref. 46:p. 28]
Step Days Process
1 15 PM establishes AP Preparation Team
2 45 Team develops draft AP
3 20-75+ Formal review process
4 5 PM resolves review comments (PEO Programs)
5 5 APEO reviews for format and policy compliance
6 5 PM and PCO sign
7 5 AIR-2.0 Signs (Contracts)
8 8 AIR- 1.0 (Plans and Policies) or PEO approves AP
108-163+ Total time required for AP process
Table 4 - AP Process Time Table
Given that APs must be complete before contract award, this process could potentially
add a considerable amount of time to the acquisition process. When the average time
from identification of a requirement to contract award is 403 days [Ref. 46: p. 32], this time
of 108 days or greater becomes a more significant part of the entire acquisition process.
Some redesigns of the process have been initiated by NAVATR. As part of a
Management Plan developed by the Contracts Competency (AIR-2.0), the AP process
was reviewed. Changes included removal of the requirement for strict compliance with
the AP document format, only requiring that it meet the requirements set forth in the FAR
and DFARS. It also allows PMs to use other program documents such as the Acquisition
Strategy Document (ASD) to fulfill the acquisition planning requirement. It also removes
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some minor, internal, administrative requirements. However, the basic process is
essentially the same. [Ref. 49]
C. REDESIGNING THE ACQUISITION PLANNING PROCESS
Given the above definition of the acquisition planning process at NAVAIR, a
number of questions must be asked and answered during the redesign process. If it is
agreed that the preparation and review of an AP is a highly sequential, paper based, people
intensive process, then what IT tools could be brought to the table to improve the
process? Which part of the process is most ripe for these technological improvements?
And finally, should the redesign be innovative and completely new, or an improvement to
the existing process?
First, a review of the AP process shown in Table 4 and Appendix E indicates that
Phase I and Phase II of the process, up to review and approval, shows that most of the
time involved in the development of the AP are in the first three steps (80 to 135 days).
This would seem to be a productive area to concentrate redesign efforts. If the time
required for these three steps were reduced by 50%, time for the preparation of an AP
would fall to 68 to 95 days. This also seems like a productive area to start in because of
the considerable paper work involved and the high level of human labor and interaction
(meetings, conferences, etc.) required.
As stated in previous chapters, IT can provide some of the leverage needed to
improve processes. Some technology is currently being used in the process. Some, such
as the Bar Code System, are used to manually track paper documents through the review
74
process. Word processors and spreadsheets are no doubt used throughout the process as
well. Other systems are alluded to such as the Program Acquisition Information Database
(PAID). PAID is a text and graphic retrieval system of select Navy and DoD documents
used in the acquisition process. [Ref. 46: p. 2] Some systems, such as the Acquisition
Tracking System (ATS), are used to track weapon systems programs and their respective
milestone dates. [Ref. 46: p 21] Still others, such as the Program Managers Information
System (PMIS), are management information systems used to provide oversight data.
There is strikingly little information in the AP publications and instructions on any other
automated system used in this process.
What IT tools could be used in the AP process? Table 5 considers the key IT
tools from above and what effect each potentially could have on the AP process. Note
that a considerable amount of the effect is the potential reduction in time. Other effects
include:
• Reduction in management oversight
• Improved process control by management



































































step 4 to 1 day.
Effect: Reduce time.
Same as above, may
eliminate step 4.
Effect: Reduce time.
Same as above; may
eliminate step 4.
Effect: Reduce time.
Same as above, may
eliminate step 4.
Effect: Reduce time.







6 Reduces to 1 day. Reduce to 1 day. None suggested. None suggested.
7 Reduce or eliminate. Reduce or eliminate. None suggested. None suggested.
8 Reduce or eliminate. None suggested. None suggested. None suggested.
Table 5 - Effect of IT on AP Process
Given this information on IT, what would the redesigned AP process now look
like? The estimates summarized in Table 6 assume that a shared database and a workflow
system are implemented to redesign the current process. Expert systems and decision
support systems (DSS) could also innovate the process, but in order to keep the redesign
simpler and based on current, readily available technology, these technologies are
excluded in the present study. Once the database and workflow systems have been
implemented, it may be prudent to reconsider these other technologies. This will also
dramatize the point that the correct application of IT can have considerably more effect
than the application that has traditionally been used such as with NAVAIR's Bar Code
System for tracking paper shuffles during the AP process.
Steps Days Process
1 1 PM establishes AP Preparation Team
2.0 45 Team develops draft AP
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2.1 Concurrent formal review of draft as developed
2.2 Concurrent PM resolution of review comments as raised
2.3 Concurrent APEO review for format and policy compliance
Note: step may be eliminated with expert system
3.0 1 Concurrent signatures electronically
47 Total time required for AP process
Table 6 - Redesigned AP Process
In the first step, it is assumed that if personnel information is available within a
combined database, 15 days would no longer be necessary to establish the team.
Functional area managers would release or obligate their personnel based on managed
workloads kept in the shared database. In the second step, it is assumed that developing
the draft would occur essentially as it is done now. What is different is that because of the
sharing of information via the database, approval could essentially occur as the AP is
written. Reviewers would be able to see the AP as team members are drafting it. As the
reviewers become more sophisticated in the use of work flow systems, the process time
may drop further as the process itselfbecomes more visible to the participants.
It should be clear from this redesign that we are not just simply introducing IT into
a broken process (i.e., "paving the cowpaths"). Rather, we are redesigning the process for
operation in an IT environment.
D. PROTOTYPING AND IMPLEMENTING THE REDESIGN
The previously discussed redesign may, or may not, be a plausible solution to
reducing the total time required to develop an AP. A radical change to the acquisition
planning process based solely on the above analysis may not provide an acceptable level of
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risk for most managers. A way to mitigate this risk would be through the development of
a prototype. Prototyping is an acceptable method to simulate and test the operation of a
new process and central to the "re-invention lab" concept. Davenport defines it as "an
iterative process in which the fit between new process structure, information technology,
and organization is refined and re-refined." [Ref 30: p. 156] It is analogous of a scientific
experiment performed to validate a hypothesis.
From an organizational aspect, it would be a small scale version that replicates the
intended process to check the validity of the design. Given the nature of the intended
change in the AP process, it would be only prudent to first test the process redesign. This
is especially important because of the sometimes unintended consequences that occur with
the implementation of new IT. Also, prototyping is essentially a learning activity. What
was constructed on paper may lack a certain reality when implemented in person. By
prototyping, lessons can be learned from mistakes in a controlled environment. Many
iterations may be required to perfect a redesign in this manner. [Ref. 30:p. 156-157]
Perhaps the most important effect to consider is on the personnel in the
organization. In more than one occasion, both within and outside of government,
organizations have mandated the implementation of a new system without a consideration
on the people involved. The technology may have been flawless, the plan superb, but the
process redesign failed to provide the desired results. Much of this is a failure to consider
the fit of technology to the people within the organization. Destroying or disrupting social
interaction by confining everyone to a computer cubicle may not produced the desired
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results even if it should have worked on paper. Prototyping may overcome this, gradually
reshaping the organizational environment or allow for a revising of the technology
involved. [Ref 30:p. 156-157] It may also highlight new needs in terms of personnel
skills, education, and training as well as organizational changes.
E. SUMMARY
Radical changes are needed to achieve the level of performance that will be
demanded in the future. Many personnel and organizational innovations have been tried
but have failed to achieve large, demonstrable returns. Process improvements, often
ignored, are once again becoming the focal point for decreasing cycle times to meet new
demands on Government organizations.
Redesigning a process demands an in depth analysis and definition of that process.
This is a learning exercise that informs and communicates much about the process under
study. It is a necessary part of the redesign effort in that it prevents the recurrence of
problems that reengineering seeks to eliminate.
Most of what is written in the form of regulation is concerned with policy over
procedure or process. This sets the boundaries within which agencies must act, but not
how they accomplish the acquisition. Only recently, via the automated Defense
Acquisition Deskbook, has the DoD began to place more emphasis on the process and not
on policy.
The acquisition planning process at NAVAIR is a relatively mature and well
developed process, but it is not well documented. It is heavily sequential, paper based,
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and personnel intensive. Little effective use of IT has been implemented. Systems
currently in place are more concerned with automating existing processes than using them
to leverage the process. Internal redesign efforts focus more on changing the existing
process through eliminating paper requirements. Overall gains from these efforts were
most likely marginal at best.
The redesign described above considered the use of IT to dramatically improve the
process. To mitigate risk, the technology used was limited to the readily available, off the
shelf variety. Startling new technologies will not necessarily make a process more
effective or efficient. In many cases, lower risk, existing technologies with a proven track
record, well applied in the design of a process, can have a considerable impact on the
productivity of an organization.
At NAVAIR, as with many other Government organizations, technology is viewed
in a completely deductive mode. What are we doing now that could be done faster with
technology? This approach will provide some improvements, but only marginal at best. A
more productive line of reasoning is inductive; how can the process be redesigned to take
advantage of technology's power?
NAVAIR, as may be representative of most Government organizations, applied
technology to track where the location is of a piece of paper in a manual routing process.
It treated the information as inventory to be accounted for in its location. At best, the AP
draft is accounted for now, no matter where it is located. A better application of
technology would be to eliminate the paper and develop a common database combined
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with a workflow scheme that is an electronic, or "virtual" plan. This requires a different
way of viewing the process. One way looks at it as a process that is broken down into its
smallest parts. The other way looks at it in the whole for a solution.
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VH. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
In doing this thesis, the researcher has tried to avoid the overuse of terms like
reengineering, Business Process Reengineering (BPR), re-invention, acquisition reform, or
any number of other terms associated with these very recent management initiatives. This
was done to avoid connotations similar to what Total Quality Management (TQM)
inspires in some minds. However, these are only the most recent in a spate of
management techniques spawned over the years. Management by objective, operations
research, management by walking around (MBWA), risk assessment and financial analysis
all fall in this genre.
Whatever the value of the above listed techniques, most, if not all, brought some
useful element or tool to the table depending on the time and the place. It is the same with
BPR. The difference in this case is that Hammer and Champy were able to bring attention
to BPR at a time when its potential could be most fully realized— when the maturity of
Information Technology (IT) could finally start to have a substantial impact on processes.
But the "reinvention" of this process focus is an idea whose time has come.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are a suggested list of actions that many
acquisition organizations could take to reengineer their procurement functions. It is not
proffered as a cookbook approach to making reengineering a workable solution. Instead,
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it is submitted as a possible course of action that could, if properly applied, significantly
reduce process times and radically improve organizational performance.
1. Identify the Process
Acquisition organizations should first learn to correctly identify and study business
processes. Too narrowly or widely defining a process reduces the likelihood of success.
The research at hand investigated the acquisition planning process. Going to a higher
level than this would have meant dealing with a process that was too large and unwieldy.
Any smaller and the benefits may begin to decrease. Additionally, the opportunity for
introducing IT into the process is less clear at either end of the extremes. The literature
suggest that somewhere between 10 and 20 key processes exist within any organization.
[Ref. 30:p. 28] However, based on the researcher's experience and observations, many
organizations place process identification at the lowest priority.
Throughout the research effort, there was strikingly little information available on
organizations that had studied their key processes. Only three articles even remotely
spoke to process analysis within organizations. The researcher can only assume that this is
indicative of its consideration on a whole. Some progress in this area may be indicated.
The Defense Acquisition Deskbook (DAD) now focuses considerably on the process
initiative. Some management literature the researcher reviewed from the Naval Air




In proposing a redesign to NAVAIR's acquisition planning process, the researcher
purposely avoided proposing the use of expert systems and decision support systems
(DSS). The reason, in addition to what was stated, was to avoid "assuming solutions" to
problems. The use of readily available IT made the solution plausible using today's
technology. However, expert systems and DSS are both mature technologies that have
been around for a number of years. The problem with inserting these technologies is that
considerable ground work must be done to develop the actual human knowledge or
wisdom that makes them viable. However, additional future gains could be made from
these technologies if started now. The researcher estimates that these systems could be in
place in two to four years from start date.
3. Evolving Processes
As seen in Chapter IV, many of the IT solutions the Government undertakes will
most likely fail or cost considerably more than anticipated while not producing the
productivity enhancements being sought. Of the many reasons previously expressed for
this failure, it is the researcher's opinion that much of it has to do with how these systems
are evolved. Typically, one of two things occur. An IT system is bought for an
organization, or group of organizations, that will supposedly solve all of their productivity
problems. An example of this would be the various purchasing systems such as SACONS,
or APADE. The other end of the spectrum is that individual offices within several
organizations will develop their own unique solutions to IT problems (Appendix B).
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Neither of these approaches will work if IT is to be successfully applied to solve process
problems, and increase productivity substantially. An new approach must be developed.
The approach suggested by the researcher is to identify a particular program
management office within a major systems command as a test laboratory. Here a
redesigned procurement process would be prototyped using IT in the manner described in
Chapter VI. A comparable or similar procurement could be done in a traditional manner
to serve as a benchmark for the test lab. In this controlled environment, metrics could be
easily established and data collected. Subsequent trials could be used to refine, or
"tweek," the system to achieve the greatest process improvement. When the system has
proven itself, and the process is well defined, it could then be exported to similar offices.
If it subsequently fails, then the damage has been contained to one area and is not as
intolerably expensive as some of our more noticeable IT failures today.
C. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FUTURE FOR STUDY
The application of business process reengineering to acquisition processes is an
area ripe for study. Little work has been done in this area, but it will undoubtedly receive
more attention in the future. This is because it is the only way to achieve the dramatic
improvements in time and money that will be required in the future. As pointed out in
Chapter III, other improvements have not dramatically improved the business cycle times
or cost elements. As more acquisition professionals realize the potency of reengineering
principles, increased attention will be focused on this area.
Some recommendations for future study include:
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1. A detailed study of the development of an Acquisition Plan within a major
systems command.
2. The relative importance of various IT tools in reducing cycle times within a
given acquisition area or process.
3. The use ofworkflow software in defining acquisition processes.
4. The definition of all the major processes within a major systems command.
D. CONCLUSIONS
It has been the researcher's intent to wave the flag; the red flag. We are at a
critical cusp in the world of acquisition reform. Much good work has been done before us
by a long line of acquisition professionals and organizations. However, the increases in
productivity and reductions in cycle time required in the future will be even more dramatic
than today. In the near term, decisions may have to be made to trade off acquisition
overhead for warfighting assets. The strategic employment of information technology will
make these decisions much more bearable. Accomplishing a reduction in cycle times
through IT will also allow us to get the latest technology in the hands of those warfighters
even sooner than we already do.
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APPENDIX A - WRITTEN AP ELEMENTS (FAR PART 7)






(i) requirements for compatibility with existing or future systems or
programs and





(iii) Application of should-cost.
Capability or performance.
Delivery or performance-period requirements
Trade-offs














5) Budgeting and funding.
6) Product descriptions.
7) Priorities, allocations, and allotments.
8) Contractor versus Government performance.
9) Inherently governmental functions.
1 0) Management information requirements.
11) Make or buy.




16) Environmental and energy conservation objectives.
17) Security considerations.
1 8) Other considerations.










Evaluation of proposals, audits, and field reports.
Beginning and completion of negotiations.
Contract preparation, review, and clearance.
Contract award.
(20) Identification of participants in acquisition plan preparation.
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APPENDIX B - ACQUISITION SOFTWARE SURVEY
As of21 February 1997
Acquisition Center's Executive System (ACES )
Acquisition Professional (AcqPro 1.6)
Acquisition Tracking Tool (ACQTRACK 1.0)
AEGIS Document Imaging System (ADIS)
Air Force Acquisition Model (AFAM)
Air Force Medical Acquisition Model (AFMAM)
Analysis Product (Archer 1.0)
Artillery Systems Analysis Product (Battleaxe 1
.0)
ASC Source Selection Application (EZSource 1.1)
Automated CDRL and Tracking System (ACTS)
Automated Cost Estimating Integrated Tools (ACEIT 2.3)
Automated Data Management System (ADMS 4.0)
Automated Information Retrieval System (AIRS/PDM)
Automated Lesson Learned Capture and Retrieval System (ALLCARS)
Automated Test Planning System (ATPS)
Automation ofProcurement and Accounting Data Entry System (APADE)
Biweekly Indicator Tracking System (BITS 2.02)
Budget/Readiness Analysis Technique (BRAT 3.0)
Commerce Business Daily-Synopsis (CBD-Syn v. 1 .7.2)
Computer Resources Information Base (CRIB)
Computer Resources Life Cycle Management Plan (CRLCMP)
Computer. Opt. Mod. Predicting/Analyzing Support/Structure (COMPASS 2.0a)
Conformer (Conformer 2. 1)
Consolidation Risk Assessment Methodology (CORAM 3.2)
Contract Action Tracking System (CATS 2.0)
Contract Appraisal System Module (CAPPS 2.2)
Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL)
Contract Monitoring Automated System (CMAS 1 .2)
Contracts Information Management System (CIMS 3.0)
Correlation Calculator for Cost-Risk Analysis (C-RISK 3.0)
Cost Analysis Decision Support System (CADSS 2.0)
Data Management System (DMS 5.25)
Distributed INFOSEC Accounting System (DIAS)
Early Warning System (EWS No Ver #)
EDI Watch! (EDI Watch N/A)
Electronic Personnel Security Questionnaire (EPSQ)
Federal Acquisition Regulations Automated (FARA 6.0)
Financial Management & Execution System (FMETS 4.3)
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Force Cost Model (FCM 96.0)
Formal Risk Analysis (FRISK 3.2)
Fuzzy Logic Applied to Risk Evaluation (FLARE )
Helicopter Analysis Product (Leonardo 1.0)
Integrated CDRL and Routing System (ICARS)
Integrated Management Information System (EvflS )
Joint Advanced Strike Technology Operating and Support Technology Evaluation Model (JOSTE
1.0)
Joint Modeling and Simulation System (J-MASS)
Joint Services Cost Oriented Resource Estimating (JCORE) Model (JCORE 1.42)
LAN Integration and Network Kernal (LINK (TM) 1
.2)
Litigation Support Data Base (LSDB 3.5.21)
Logisitcs Planning and Requirements Systems (LOGPARS 3.1)
Louis Link and Louis H (LOUIS 2.38)
Maritime Patrol Aircraft Analysis Product (Pegasus 1.1)
Master Acquisition Program Plan (MAPP)
Merged Obligation and Liquidation Tracking System (MOLTS 1.1)
Military Specifications and Standards Data Repository (MILSPEC 1.1)
Modernized Parts Control Automated Support System (MPCASS)
Multi-User Engineering Change Proposal Automated Review System (MEARS)
Naval Aviation Lessons Learned (NALL No Vers #)
Operating and support Management Information System (OSMIS FY95)
Paragraph Analyzer (PARANA)
Parametric Cost Estimating Relationship Module (PACER 2.0)
Parametric Review of Information for Costing and Evaluation (PRICE PRICE S V2.ll, PRICE
H/HL/MV3.0)
Performance Analyzer for Windows (PA Win 1.2)
Pre-Award Information Exchange System (PDCS 2.0)
Process Analysis and Project Integrated Environment-Integrated Knowledge Environment (PAPIE-
KE4.0)
Procurement and Contracts Tracking System (PACTS 6.5)
Procurement Contract Monitoring System (ProCMAS 3.0)
Procurement Network (PROCNET)
Procurement Request Information System Module (PRISM 6.4)
Program Acquisition Management System (PAMS 1.12)
Program Integration Scheduling and Management System/ARDEC (PRISM/ARDEC 3.0)
Program Management Automated Data System (PMADS 1.0)
Program Manager's Workstation (PMWS)
Proposal Evaluation tool (PET 1.1)
Purchase Request Entry Module (PREM 6.4)
Reliability and Maintainability Logistics (RAMLOG No Vers #)
Requisition Automated Processing System (RAPS)
Resource Analysis Decision Support System (RADSS 5.3)
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RFP Guidelines (RFPGUIDE5)
Satellite Communications Management Information System (SCMIS 3.1)
Security Information Management System (SEMS)
Security Management System (SecurTrac 1.0)
Shared Program Information Network (SPINE )
Software Specification Assistant (SSA 3.4)
Specification Trainer-Editor (SpecTrE)
Supply Automated Management System (SAMS)
System Evaluation and Estimation ofResources (SEER)
Team Work Plan (TWP)
Turbo Streamliner (TURBO 1.0)
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APPENDIX C - PLANS SUBSUMED BY THE MAPP
Source: NAVSEA Master Acquisition Planning Program Handbook
1. Acquisition Plan
2. Computer Resources Integrated Support
3. Computer Resources Life-Cycle
Management Plan
4. Configuration Audit Plan
5. Configuration Plan
6. Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle
Support (CALS) Implementation Plan
7. Depot Planning Annex
8. Electromagnetic Compatibility Program Plan
9. Electromagnetic Interference Control Plan
10. Electrostatic Discharge Control Program Plan
1 1
.
Engineering Change Proposal System Safety
Report
12. Engineering Data Management Plan
13. Equipment Facilities Requirements Plan
14. Facilities Requirements Plan
15. Facilities Requirements Report
16. Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Plan
17. Government Concept of Operation (CALS)
18. Hardness Assurance, Maintenance, and
Surveillance Plans
19. Hardness Surveillance Plan
20. Human Engineering Dynamic Simulation
Plan
21. Human Engineering Program Plan
22. Human Systems Integration Plan
23. Implementation Plan
24. Integrated Logistic Support Plan
25. Integrated Support Plan
26. Interface Requirements Specification
27. Interim Contractor Supply Support
Management Plan Report
28. Interim Contractor Support Plan
29. Interim Support Plan
30. Level of Repair Program Plan
31. Logistic Support Analysis Plan
32. Logistics Requirements Funding Summary
33. Logistics Support Analysis Plan
34. Logistics Support Analysis Use Study
35. Maintenance Plan
36. Manpower, Personnel, and Training (MPT)
Concept Document
37. Military Characteristics Document
38. MPT Resources Requirements Document
39. Navy Training Plan
40. Nuclear Hardness and Survivability Program
Plan
41. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Contamination Survivability Assurance Plan
42. Operation Requirements Document
43. Operations Support Plan
44. Packaging Management Plan
45. Packaging, Handling, Storage, and
Transportation Program Plan
46. Phased Support Plan
47. Post Production Support Plan
48. Program Protection Implementation Plan
49. Quality Assurance Program Plan
50. Radar Spectrum Management Control Plan
51. Real-Time Outfitting Management
Information Systems Management Plan
52. Reliability and Maintainability Program Plan
53. Risk Management Plan
54. Safety Studies Plan
55. Site Evaluation Report
56. Software Development Plan
57. Software Quality Program Plan
58. Software Support Transition Plan
59. Standardization Accomplishment Report
60. Standardization Program Plan
6 1
.
Supply Support Management Plan
62. Support Site Activation Plan
63. Supportability Assessment Plan
64. System Safety Hazard Analysis Report
65. System Safety Program Plan
66. Technical Data Acquisition Plan
67. Technical Data Management Plan
68. Technical Manual Organization Plan
69. Technical Manual Plan
70. Technical Manual Publication Plan
71. Technical Manual Quality Assurance
Program Plan
72. Technical Manual Schedules and Status
Report
73. Technical Manual Validation Plan
74. Technical Manual Verification Plan
75. Test and Evaluation Master Plan
76. Test and Evaluation Program Plan
77. Testability Program Plan
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78. Training Device Requirements Document
79. Training Effectiveness Evaluation Plan
80. Training Equipment Requirements Document
81. Training Facilities Report
82. Training Systems Alternative Report
83. Transition Plan
84. Transportation Plan
85. User's Logistics Support Summary
86. Verification, Demonstration, and Evaluation
Plan
87. Version Description Document
88. Waiver or Deviation Safety Report
89. Weapon System and Equipment Transition
Plan
Note: Plans in bold type are required by DoD/DoN 5000 series instructions.
Note: Many of the incorporated plans have duplicate titles. The total number of plans subsumed in the
current version ofMAPP is 101.
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APPENDIX E - NAVAIR AP PROCESS
PEO (A) and PEO(T) ACQUISITION PLAN
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